This paper investigates the role of welfare receipt in shaping norms regarding work and welfare using unique Australian data from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Project. We begin by incorporating welfare into a theoretical model of the transmission of work-welfare norms across generations. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we find evidence that youths' attitudes towards work and welfare may be influenced by socialization within their families. Young people are more likely to oppose generous social benefits and to believe that social inequality stems from individual characteristics if i) their mothers support these views; ii) their mothers were employed while they were growing up; and iii) their families never received welfare. Finally, youths' work-welfare norms appear to be unrelated to their neighbors' welfare receipt suggesting that socialization occurs primarily within families rather than within neighborhoods. JEL-Classification: I38, H31, Z1, J00
Introduction
Social assistance programs affect behavior by altering the economic incentives to get a job, pursue educational or training opportunities, and adopt particular family structures.
They may also influence behavior by changing preferences and social norms. Of particular concern is the possibility that growing up in welfare-reliant families or neighborhoods weakens children's work ethic by reducing the costs associated with welfare receipt. In effect, the welfare system itself may lead to a culture of dependence that results in welfare receipt being passed from one generation to the next. This notion of welfare culture has its antecedents in theories of poverty from the 1960s and largely attributes welfare dependency to the values and norms that children learn from their parents and neighbors (see Duncan et al., 1988; Patterson, 1986; Corcoran, 1995; Gottschalk, 2005; Bartholomae et al., 2004) . As such, intergenerational welfare dependency represents a form of cultural transmission in which preferences, beliefs, and norms of behavior develop through social interactions both across and within generations.
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Our objective is to investigate how young people's perspectives on work and welfare are shaped by their mothers' work-welfare norms and their family's welfare history.
We are particularly interested in the following questions. How are the work-welfare norms of mothers and their adult children related? Does this relationship depend on the family's previous interaction with the welfare system or on the welfare profile of the surrounding neighborhood? To address these questions, we first present a theoretical model of the transmission of work attitudes across generations. Our goal is not to provide a formal test of the theoretical model, but rather to use it as the basis for specifying the determinants of young people's work-welfare norms and to generate empirical predictions. Estimation is then conducted using data from the Youth in Focus Project, which interviewed approximately 2,400 pairs of young Australians (aged 18) and their mothers about their attitudes towards work, welfare, and what it takes to get ahead in life. These Australian 1 See Bowles (1998) and Bisin and Verdier (2010) . For empirical evidence on cultural transmission, see, for example, Fernandez and Olivetti (2004) on gender role attitudes, Ribar and Wilhelm (2006) on elder support attitudes, Patacchini and Zenou (2007) on educational outcomes, Wilhelm et al. (2008) on generosity, and Dohmen et al. (2012) on risk attitudes. .
2 survey data are linked to almost twelve years of administrative welfare data for these families, providing a unique opportunity to assess the role of welfare histories in shaping youths' work-welfare norms.
Understanding how work-welfare norms are formed is important. A vast literature documents that welfare receipt is correlated across generations.
2 While some of this intergenerational correlation in social assistance receipt is almost certainly spurious, there is also evidence of a causal link (see Gottschalk, 1996; Pepper, 2000; Beaulieu et al., 2005) . Whether or not causality arises because welfare receipt affects the formation of work norms remains an open question. Parents can reduce moral hazard by instilling a strong work ethic in their children (Gradstein, 2009; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006) .
However, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) argue that parents' incentives to invest in their children's work norms are weakened by generous social insurance institutions. They find empirical support for this proposition using variation in social expenditures across OECD countries. They are unable, however, to observe the socialization of work norms within families. In contrast, we make an important contribution in directly linking youths' workwelfare norms to those of their mothers, to their family welfare history, and to the welfare profile of their neighborhood.
We find evidence that youths' attitudes towards work and welfare may be shaped by socialization within their families. Young people are more likely to oppose generous social benefits and adopt an internal view of social inequality if i) their mothers support these views; ii) their mothers were employed while they were growing up; and iii) their families never received welfare. Finally, youths' work-welfare norms appear to be unrelated to their neighbors' welfare receipt, suggesting that socialization occurs primarily within families rather than neighborhoods.
A Model of the Intergenerational Transmission of Norms
Our conceptual framework is based on Bisin and Verdier (2001) . We assume that children are shaped by their parents as well as their neighborhoods, and focus our attention on preferences for work versus leisure as the foundation of individuals' work ethic.
3 Preferences for work versus leisure are closely linked with individuals' beliefs about the sources of social inequality, one of the work-welfare norms we focus on in the empirical analysis.
That is, those with a strong work ethic are also likely to believe that success depends on factors within individual control, such as hard work. We also assume that individuals' work ethic is closely related to their views on unemployment benefits, which is the second work-welfare norm we use in the empirical analysis. In the interest of space, we do not formally model the link between work ethic and preferences for redistribution, but this can be done by expanding the model to include voting. 
Transition probabilities and parents' utility function
Suppose each family consists of one parent and a child. There are two types of parents.
Type L has a high marginal utility of leisure, (i.e., low work ethic), and type H has a low marginal utility of leisure (i.e., high work ethic). Parents have a total time endowment of one unit which they allocate to labor supply (l i ) and leisure (1 − l i ).
We assume that parents do not know the exact wage rate they will face in the labor market when they make their labor supply decisions. This allows us to capture the effect of exogenous labor market shocks on outcomes. The uncertainty regarding wages is resolved after the labor supply choice is made. Each parent independently draws a wage w from a common distribution F with support in [w, w] and density f .
Parents are expected utility maximizers. The expected utility a parent of type i receives from consumption and leisure can be written as
where c i (w) stands for the consumption level of type i ∈ {L, H} for a given wage rate w, l i captures the parent's labor supply choice, and γ i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the parent's work ethic.
The utility received from leisure is given by (1 − γ i ) Z (1 − l i ), which is a strictly concave and increasing function with Z (0) = ∞ and Z (1) = 0. We assume that γ H > γ L which is consistent with parents with a higher work ethic having a lower taste for leisure.
Parents also care about their children's utility. Children are born without any inclinations and are shaped by their parents and the environment. Let q ij for i, j ∈ {L, H} be the probability that a child with a parent of type i has values of type j. We assume that four things affect children's values: parental labor supply (l i ), parental work ethic (γ i ), the parent's experience with the welfare system, and the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic (σ). Parents are successful in passing a strong work ethic on to their children with a probability that is proportional to their labor supply choice. However, a working parent with a weak work ethic is less convincing than a working parent with a strong work ethic. This may be because those parents with a weak work ethic complain more about work, which makes them less effective in passing a strong work ethic on to their children. Moreover, we assume that parents who have received welfare find it more difficult to transfer a high work ethic to their children irrespective of their own work ethic.
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Specifically, for a parent of type i, where i ∈ {L, H}, the probability of passing a strong work ethic is given by δ k γ i l i , where k ∈ {s, ns} denotes whether the family has ever received support (s) or not (ns). We assume that δ s < δ ns = 1. If the parent is not successful in passing on a strong work ethic (with probability 1 − δ k γ i l i ), then the child 5 This may be because welfare dependency reduces the stigma attached to welfare receipt and thus reduces the value of having a strong work ethic. This issue could be dealt with more explicitly in a model where individuals care about their economic performance with respect to their reference group (of which their own family is a part). Thus, children growing up in families with welfare dependency may have lower aspirations than children growing up in families with no welfare dependency since they see welfare receipt as more acceptable. See Lindbeck et al. (2003) and Ljunge (2012) for models where the non-monetary cost of taking up welfare benefits depends on the behavior of the previous generation.
is randomly matched with somebody in the neighborhood. In this case, the greater the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic (σ), the higher the chances the child will develop a strong work ethic. Thus, the child's overall probability of having a strong work ethic is given by
if the parent has a strong work ethic and
if the parent has a weak work ethic. The child will have a weak work ethic if both the parent and society were unsuccessful in passing a strong work ethic on to the child. This occurs with probability
for the type H and type L parent, respectively.
As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) , parents are altruistic, but in a paternalistic way.
That is, they correctly anticipate their children's future labor supply behavior, but they evaluate their children's future utility from their own perspective. Let V ij γ i , l C * j for i, j ∈ {L, H} represent the expected altruistic utility a parent of type i receives if her child is of type j. Since the utility of the child is evaluated from the perspective of the parent, V ij is a function of the parent's taste parameter, γ i , and the child's optimal labor supply choice, l C * j . It is defined as
, where c C * j (w) stands for the optimal consumption choice of the child for a given wage 6 rate w. If the parent and the child are of the same type (i.e., have the same work ethic), then the child's labor supply choice, l C * j , maximizes the parent's altruistic utility. Hence,
reflects the parent's expected utility gain if her child has the same work ethic as herself.
We can now write the expected utility of a parent of type i as
where i, j ∈ {H, L} and k ∈ {s, ns} as above. Note that q k ii and q k ij may take on different values depending on the realization of w since the parent may receive welfare in some states of the world but not in others.
Parents maximize their expected utility by choosing l i subject to their budget constraint. We assume that individuals automatically qualify for (and receive) welfare if their income falls below y. With a means-tested benefit system and a taper rate of b, the level of welfare received is equal to b ( y − l i w). A parent who has chosen a high level of labor supply may still receive welfare if the wage realization is sufficiently low. As a result, for a given choice of l i , the budget constraint is given by
Analysis
The transition probabilities defined in equations 1-4 imply that the likelihood that a child will have a strong work ethic is increasing in the amount of time the parent works. In other words, ∂q 
Empirical predictions
To summarize, the key feature of the model is that children's work-welfare norms are shaped by socialization both inside and outside the family. We find that parents with a strong work ethic are more likely to have children with a strong work ethic. Children are also more likely to have strong work ethic if their parents work more and/or do not receive welfare. Moreover, although a stronger neighborhood work ethic has an ambiguous impact on the norms of the children of parents with a strong work ethic, it increases the probability that parents with a weak work ethic have children who also develop a strong work ethic. We use these insights to specify the empirical model and to provide a framework for interpreting our results. (Breunig et al., 2007) .
Consequently, these social security records provide high-quality, fortnightly data on the level and type of payments received for a birth cohort of young Australians whose families received a wide range of social benefits.
These administrative data were used to categorize youths and their parents into one of six groups depending on the recency and intensity of the family's welfare receipt.
A stratified random sample of young people and a corresponding parent or guardian-in 9 96.5 percent of cases the biological mother-was then selected from the administrative data for interview. Data from separate phone interviews with youths and their parents as well as a self-completion questionnaire administered to youths were then matched to the administrative social security data (Breunig et al. 2007 ).
6
The Australian government does not consider either the Family Tax Benefit or the Child Care Benefit to be welfare payments as they are essentially tax concessions to families. Similar benefits in the U.S. are provided through the tax system in the form of standard deductions for dependent children and child care rebates. Thus, we do not classify these payments as welfare, leaving 40.9 percent of the young people in the administrative data with no history of parental welfare receipt. The most common welfare payments in this population are payments to low-income parents (Parenting Payment
Single or Parenting Payment Partnered) or unemployment benefits (Newstart Allowance).
Unemployment benefits are both income-and asset-tested, are funded out of general tax revenue, and are not related to individuals' earnings or employment histories.
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We compare the norms of three groups: youth who have no family history of welfare receipt, youth whose families received moderate (i.e., less than six years) welfare (31.6 percent), and youth whose families received intensive (i.e., six or more years) welfare (27.5 percent) while they were growing up. We have necessarily made a number of sample restrictions. We drop 74 pairs in which the responding parent was not the biological mother and 286 pairs in which either the youth or mother provided incomplete information. Consequently, our estimation sample consists of 2,070 pairs of youth and their mothers who both have complete survey data for the variables of interest. In some cases, the sample is 1,364 observations due to missing data on mothers' norms. Summary statistics are in Appendix Table B1 .
Work-Welfare Norms and Welfare History
Young people and their mothers were asked for their views about the government's role in supporting the unemployed and what it takes to get ahead in life. Specifically, respondents were asked whether the government or unemployed individuals (and their families) themselves should mainly be responsible for ensuring that the unemployed have enough to live on, and whether current unemployment benefits are too high or too low. Individuals were also asked about the importance of having 1) well-educated parents, 2) a good education themselves, 3) ambition, and 4) a job in getting ahead in life (see Appendix   Table B2 ). Finally, mothers were also asked about the importance of coming from a wealthy background.
Responses to these questions form the basis of our indicators of work-welfare norms since unemployment benefits are an important component of the Australian welfare system. Specifically, Sabbagh and Vanhuysse (2006) argue that norms regarding the welfare state can be understood in the context of two competing ideological frameworks; one based on markets and the other based on a welfare state. The market-based perspective is associated with a strong work ethic, a focus on individual responsibility, and a view that social inequality is driven primarily by individuals' actions. In contrast, the welfarestatist perspective is characterized by a desire for egalitarian redistribution, support for universal benefits, and a view that social inequality stems from unconstrained market forces rather than individual characteristics. Drawing upon this conceptual framework, we begin by creating a series of seven indicator variables which take the value of one for responses that are consistent with the market-based frame and zero for responses that are consistent with the welfare-state frame (see Appendix Table B2 ). 8 Weighted means, standard deviations, and p-values on tests for differences in mothers' and youths' mean responses are presented in Table 1 .
Mothers are significantly less likely than their 18 year-old children to believe that unemployment benefits are too high and that individuals (and their families) are responsible for looking after the unemployed (see Table 1 ). Almost two-thirds (62.0 percent) of mothers think that having a good education is very important in getting ahead, although only half (50.3 percent) of young people share this view. Rather, 18
year-olds are significantly more likely to believe that it is having well-educated parents that leads to success in life. Mothers and youth differ most in their views of the value of having a job in getting ahead in life with mothers being significantly more likely than their children (81.0 versus 59.0 percent) to regard having a job as very important. Both agree, however, that one's own ambition is very important in getting ahead. Finally, only 5.5 percent of mothers believe that success is closely tied to coming from a wealthy background.
[ Table 1 here]
It is also interesting to begin to consider how norms regarding work versus welfare might be correlated within families. Table 2 reports youths' norms conditional on those of their mothers. For example, 67.9 percent of young people believe that unemployment benefits are too high when their mother reports believing the same. Only 46.1 percent of youth think that unemployment benefits are too high when their mothers disagree with this viewpoint. This difference is highly significant. Overall, the correlation in mother and youth norms ranges from 0.322 (the level of unemployment benefits) to 0.098 (the importance of a job in getting ahead).
[ Table 2 here]
Finally, work-welfare norms are related to welfare receipt (see Table 3 ). Mothers
and their 18 year-old children are both less likely to say that unemployment benefits are too high, and that individuals and their families should look after the unemployed if the family has received welfare at some point in the past. At the same time, youths' perceptions of what it takes to get ahead in life do not depend on their families' exposure to the welfare system. Mothers with a history of welfare receipt, however, are significantly more likely to believe that having a good education, having a good job, and coming from a wealthy background are very important in getting ahead.
[ Table 3 here]
4 The Empirical Framework
The Econometric Model
Our challenge is to make the best use of our multiple indicators of each individual's latent norm towards work versus welfare. Many economists in similar situations aggregate the multiple indicators into a single index and then adopt an estimation strategy suitable for the latent-variable nature of the problem. In our case, however, the weights underpinning the index would necessarily be ad hoc given that we have no information about the contribution that each indicator makes in predicting norms regarding work versus welfare.
Unfortunately, estimation results are likely to be sensitive to the weights we choose. Consequently, we use multiple YIF survey responses as related indicators of youths' and mothers' latent norms. We focus on and estimate the determinants of two alternative work-welfare norms. The first captures support for generous social benefits (i.e., views about the level of unemployment benefits and the appropriate role of the government in supporting the unemployed), while the second captures individuals' beliefs about the determinants of social inequality (i.e., the relative importance of own and family-background characteristics in life success). 10 Given the parameterization of the underlying indicator variables (see Appendix Table B2 ), the first outcome measure in-forms us about the extent to which young people support the public provision of generous unemployment benefits, while the second outcome measure sheds light on the extent to which young people believe that social inequality is driven by factors that are internal to individuals and their families. We refer to the first as the "social benefit" norm and to the second as the "social inequality" norm.
Our estimation model consists of two parts. The first is a single behavioral (structural) equation characterizing youths' work-welfare norms based on the insights derived from the theoretical model set out in Section 2. The second is a series of measurement equations which relate our observed responses (indicators) to the underlying latent workwelfare norms (see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2005; and DePolt et al., 2009 ). The determinants of the behavioral and measurement equations are then estimated jointlyonce for social benefit norms and once for social inequality norms. We discuss each part of the model in turn.
Behavioral (Structural) Equation
According to our theoretical model, youths' work-welfare norms are a function of their family circumstance (i.e., the welfare history, labor supply, and norms of their parents) and the neighborhoods in which they live. Consequently, we assume youths' norms are given by
where w is a vector capturing the welfare history of the youth's family, η * c and η * p are the latent, continuous work-welfare norms of youths and mothers, respectively, and L is mothers' labor supply choice (i.e., employment status when the youth was aged 14).
Unfortunately, our data do not provide a measure of work-welfare norms in the surround- work-welfare norms to be positively related to those of their mothers, and growing up in a family with a history of welfare receipt or in which the mother did not work to be associated with having norms that are less consistent with the market-based frame.
In contrast, the welfare profile of other people in the neighborhood has a theoretically ambiguous effect on a youth's norms regarding work versus welfare.
Measurement Equations
Responses to multiple YIF survey questions are used as indicators of latent work-welfare norms (see Appendix Table B2 ). The nature of these questions implies that responses do not form continuous indicators of work-welfare norms. Rather, the data result in ordered, discrete variables reflecting respondents' views on either (i) the role of the government in assisting the unemployed (social benefit norm) or (ii) the importance of individual and family-background characteristics in getting ahead in life (social inequality norm).
To take into account the ordered, discrete nature of our indicators, we assume 11 We control for demographic characteristics including indicators for whether the youth is female and indigenous/TSI, and parental characteristics including immigrant indicators, indicators for whether the youth lived with both parents at the age of 14, whether parents attended school committees, indicators for mother and father education, whether youth left home before turning 16 years old, and whether youth dropped out of school before the age of 16.
12 Higher values of η * p and η * c represent support for market-based norms (i.e., less support for generous unemployment benefits and a belief that individual and family-background characteristics are important in driving social inequality). Lower values are consistent with more support for the welfare state.
that both youths' and mothers' latent work-welfare norms (η * c and η * p ) determine an associated set of latent continuous indicators which we denote by y * cj and y * pk . Here, j = 1, ..., J and k = 1, ..., K index the specific attitudinal questions answered by the youth and the mother, respectively, while J and K are the number of indicators used to account for youths' and mothers' latent work-welfare norms. Each indicator is then imperfectly related to individuals' unobserved work-welfare norms in the following way: 
for i = {c, p}. In these expressions, the δs are threshold parameters satisfying the restric-tion that δ 1j < δ 2j < ... < δ M j while M denotes the number of categories for an indicator.
The value of M is different for the social benefits norm and the social inequality norm.
For the social benefit norm M = 2 for all indicators, while for the social inequality norm M = 4 for youth and M = 5 for mothers because mothers were allowed an additional category in their possible answers.
Estimation Strategy
Our model results in a system of J (ordered) probit equations -one equation for each of the observed indicators of youths' work-welfare norms. To see this, substitute (6) into (7a) to get
This system, however, imposes cross-equation restrictions on some of the parameters.
Moreover, each equation includes a common error term ε in addition to the common latent norm for the mother η * p (which was assumed to be independently normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 p ).
We use the software aM L to generate Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameters in the system and their robust standard errors. Since the latent norm variables have no intrinsic units of measurement, we normalize one λ parameter in the system of equations for the youth (expression 7a) and one λ parameter in the system of equations for the mother (expression 7b) to one. This identification restriction allows us to estimate all other parameters. Our model produces estimates of 1) the determinants of youths' work-welfare norms (α, γ, θ, π, β); 2) the variance of the latent parental norm index (σ 2 p ), and 3) the factor loadings in the measurement equations (λ cj ∀j = 1, ..., J − 1, λ pk ∀k = 1, ..., K − 1).
5 The Determinants of Work-Welfare Norms
Results from the Measurement Equations
We begin by considering whether the measurement equations set out in (7a) and (7b) yield estimates that are consistent with our view that high values of the latent variables Table B2 ). This interpretation of η * c and η * p will be born out by the data, however, only if all λ parameters are strictly positive after we have imposed the identification restrictions. Table 4 reports Maximum Likelihood estimates of these parameters (λ) for both the social benefits and social inequality models. 13 Although the parameters for the behavioral and measurement equations of the model are estimated jointly, for simplicity, Table 4 reports only the estimates from the measurement equations. We consider two specifications. The first is the baseline specification previously discussed (columns 1 and 3). The second adds interactions for i) mothers' norms and intensive welfare receipt; ii) mothers' norms and an indicator of whether the youth lived with both parents at age 14;
and iii) mothers' labor supply and youths' gender (columns 2 and 4). Heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors are given in parentheses. The estimated standard deviation of mothers' latent norms (σ η * p ) and the implied standard deviation of youths' latent norms
) are also presented. 14 These will be useful in calculating marginal effects from the behavioral equation.
[ Table 4 here]
13 Estimates of the factor loadings (λ cj , λ pk ) reflect the weight (loading) that the common latent norm (either η * c or η * p ) has on responses to the associated survey question (see DePolt et al., 2009 ). 14 We calculateσ η * 
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The results in Table 4 
Results from the Behavioral Equation
Having established that interpreting our latent norm variables as "work ethic" is consistent with the data, we now consider the estimated determinants of youths' norms regarding work versus welfare. It is very difficult, however, to interpret the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in the behavioral equation because the latent norm variables (η * c and η * p ) do not have intrinsic units of measurement. Fortunately, our estimation strategy provides estimates of the standard deviation of mothers' latent work ethic and we can calculate the standard deviation of youths' latent work ethic that is implied by our estimates (see Table 4 ). These calculations can then be used to transform estimated coefficients into marginal effects, which are interpreted in terms of standard deviation (std.) changes in youths' latent work ethic. Table 5 presents these marginal effects while the underlying coefficients and robust standard errors are given in Appendix Table B3 .
The results indicate that youths' work-welfare norms are related to the welfare histories of their families. Young people who grow up in families that never received welfare are significantly more likely to oppose the public provision of generous unemployment benefits than are young people growing up in families with a history of intensive welfare receipt. Specifically, youth in families receiving intensive welfare have a propensity to oppose generous unemployment benefits that is 0.400 std. lower than that of youth in non-welfare families.
15 This is consistent with the view that a history of welfare receipt contributes to producing an intergenerational culture of welfare dependency by lowering the work ethic of children. At the same time, youth in families with a more moderate interaction with the welfare system do not differ significantly from youths in non-welfare families in their support for generous unemployment benefits. Thus, it may be the intensity, rather than the incidence, of welfare receipt which is most important in understanding the potential for a welfare culture to develop.
Welfare receipt has only a weak impact on young people's norms regarding the source of social inequality. Those in families with a history of intensive welfare receipt have the same views about getting ahead in life as those with no exposure to the welfare system at all. Youths with a history of modest welfare receipt are somewhat less likely than those in non-welfare families to believe that social inequality stems from one's own effort and family background. This effect, however, is small in magnitude (0.166 std.) and only marginally significant. Clearly, the link between youths' views of welfare and their families' welfare histories depends on the dimension of work-welfare norms considered.
[ Table 5 here]
We also find support for the transmission of work-welfare norms across gener- Interestingly, there is no statistically significant interaction between a mother's work-welfare norms and having an family history of intensive welfare receipt (see columns 2 and 4 in Table 5 ). In other words, the effect of having a mother who supports (rather than opposes) generous unemployment benefits or who believes that getting ahead is driven by something other than one's individual and family-background characteristics is not compounded by a history of intensive welfare receipt. Conversely, the negative effect of a family history of welfare on youths' work ethic is also not mitigated if welfare mothers have a strong work ethic themselves. Moreover, the relationship between the norms of mothers and their 18-year old children also does not depend on whether or not young people were living with their fathers at age 14. This suggests that intergenerational transmission of norms from mothers to children does not appear to be affected by the presence of fathers in the household.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that youths' norms regarding work versus welfare are influenced by their mothers' employment status when the youth was aged 14. At the same time, there is no evidence that mothers' work histories differentially affect the norms of young women as opposed to young men (see columns 2 and 4). These results suggest that both the presence of welfare and an absence of work within the family are important in understanding young people's work-welfare norms.
Although our theoretical framework implies that young people's work-welfare norms are shaped by those of their neighbors, the direction of this effect is theoretically ambiguous. We find no evidence that young people's norms regarding work versus welfare are driven by the welfare experiences of those in their current neighborhoods (as defined by post codes). Specifically, the proportion of families in a youth's current neighborhood that have never received welfare is unrelated to young people's views about unemployment benefits and social inequality. This effect is much larger than that associated with mothers' norms or welfare history and is of the opposite sign. Finally, young people are also more likely to believe that getting ahead stems from individual and family-background characteristics when they have a highly educated father (0.234 std.).
Summary
Taken together these results provide support for our intergenerational transmission model of work-welfare norms. Youths are much more likely to oppose the public provision of generous unemployment benefits and believe that social inequality stems from individuals' characteristics or family background if their mothers share these views and have a history of employment. Work-welfare norms are also shaped by welfare histories, although there is evidence that welfare intensity may be more important than welfare incidence and that the strength of this relationship depends on which dimension of work-welfare norms we are considering. Still, there appears to be a potential for welfare receipt to produce a welfare culture by reducing the work ethic of children. At the same time, we find no evidence that youths' work-welfare norms are related to the welfare profiles of others in their neighborhoods.
Robustness Testing: Is the Effect of Welfare History Causal?
In order for the intergenerational transmission of a weak work ethic (welfare acceptance) from welfare parents to their children to result in a culture of welfare dependence, it must be the case that welfare receipt as a child causes one to be more accepting of welfare and less inclined to work. The results stemming from our social benefits model do indicate that young people's propensity to oppose the public provision of generous unemployment benefits is significantly lower if their families have a history of intensive welfare receipt.
This relationship can be interpreted causally only if the identifying assumptions of the estimation model hold. It is therefore important to assess the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions.
It is arguably reasonable to assume that children's views are molded by those of their mothers, but that the reverse is not true. This intergenerational ordering assumption has been used in previous research to rule out reverse causality and to identify the causal effect of welfare exposure on youth outcomes (see Gottschalk, 1996; Pepper, 2000; Beaulieu et al., 2005) , and is arguably a reasonable approach to use here also. However, it must be acknowledged that since youths' and mothers' welfare attitudes are measured contemporaneously, we cannot be certain.
We are much more concerned about the validity of our conditional independence assumption. In particular, we have assumed that a family's welfare history (w) is uncorrelated with the error term (ε) in the youth's work-welfare norm equation, raising concerns about the potential bias from omitted factors that drive outcomes at a family level. We investigate this issue in two ways.
First, we provide a robustness check by estimating a series of models increasing in controls. The first specification estimates the unconditional effect of family welfare history on youths' work-welfare norms, while subsequent specifications sequentially control for mothers' norms, youth characteristics, parental characteristics, and the neighborhood's welfare profile (see Table 6 ). The results indicate that the estimated effect of family welfare history on youths' norms is relatively stable. The estimated marginal effect of intensive welfare receipt in reducing opposition to social benefits varies from 0.572 to 0.400 standard deviations, while the marginal effect ranges from 0.102 to 0.139 standard deviations in the social inequality model. Similarly, there is little change in the estimated effect of having a history of moderate welfare receipt as we add additional controls. The stability of these results provides some reassurance that our results are not completely driven by an omitted variable bias.
Second, our data provide us with limited information about the characteristics of grandparents. In particular, we know whether the mother's family took annual vacations when she was age 14. We use this information as an instrument in a model in which it is assumed that the socio-economic status of the older generation affects the outcomes of their children (i.e. mothers' welfare histories) but not the outcomes of their grandchildren (i.e. youth's work-welfare norms). As usual, this is a maintained assumption that cannot 24 be tested. However, as parents are the primary decision makers and role models for their children, we believe it is reasonable to assume that grandparents' socio-economic status influences children's outcomes only through their parents' characteristics. In a similar way, Maurin (2002) also uses information about grandparents to estimate the effect of parental income on children's schooling. 17 Our instrument is a significant predictor of the mother's propensity to have received intensive welfare (p = 0.019), but it is not particularly powerful (F = 5.48). Despite this, we continue to find a large negative effect of intensive welfare on the propensity of young people to oppose generous unemployment benefits. However, the magnitude of the IV estimate (−0.263) is, as expected, somewhat smaller than the estimate which results from treating family welfare history as exogenous (−0.349) and not quite significant at the 10 percent level in a one tailed test (p = 0.113).
Our instrument also predicts whether the family has ever received welfare (p = 0.005 with F = 7.73). However, we find no evidence that receiving welfare as a child reduces the propensity to adopt an internal view of social inequality once we instrument for the family's welfare history.
[ Table 6 here]
Conclusions
This paper investigates the process underpinning the intergenerational transmission of norms regarding work, welfare, and personal responsibility. We find evidence in support of the transmission of work-welfare norms across generations. Consistent with our theoretical model, young people's views of work versus welfare appear to be shaped through socialization within their families. Specifically, those growing up in a family with a history of welfare receipt are less likely to oppose the public provision of generous unemployment benefits and to believe that social inequality stems from individual effort and family background than those growing up in non-welfare families. Young people are also more likely to oppose generous social benefits and adopt an internal view of social inequality if their mothers support these views and have a history of being employed. Finally, youths' norms towards welfare appear to be unrelated to their neighbors' welfare receipt, suggesting that socialization occurs primarily within families rather than neighborhoods.
What do these results tell us then about the potential for the intergenerational transmission of a weak work ethic-alternatively welfare acceptance-from mothers to children to result in an intergenerational culture of welfare dependence? On the one hand, we do find that a family history of welfare receipt significantly affects the workwelfare norms of 18-year olds, although welfare intensity may be more salient than welfare incidence and the size of the impact depends on the specific dimension of work-welfare norms being considered. This is in a sense a necessary condition for the development of a welfare culture.
On the other hand, we remain a long way from establishing that the sufficient conditions for a welfare culture exist. The stability of our results provides some reassurance that the estimated link between work-welfare norms and family welfare histories is not completely the result of omitted variable bias. Moreover, the negative effect of intensive welfare receipt as a child on youths' propensity to oppose generous social benefits (i.e., favor work) generally remains even after we do our best to account for the potential endogeneity of family welfare history. Still, we do not find a corresponding effect of welfare histories on norms towards social inequality, suggesting that welfare does not necessarily affect all dimensions of work-welfare norms equally.
It is also the case that we are unable to disentangle the effects of welfare receipt per se from the effects of broader socio-economic disadvantage or particular family structures which lead families to require welfare in the first place. Thus, we are unable to say whether it is receiving social assistance in and of itself that shapes young peoples' views or it is their social and economic circumstances more generally.
Even more importantly, while welfare receipt as a child appears to have an independent effect on the views of young adults regarding the public provision of generous unemployment benefits, it is not at all clear that these norms can be linked to those out-26 comes which are relevant for welfare receipt. Greenwell et al. (1998) , for example, present evidence for the United States that individuals' "willingness to use welfare" is not related to their employment outcomes. Given that social assistance is linked to bad outcomesnot bad norms-future research will need to investigate which norms are most relevant for understanding young people's educational, labor market, and health outcomes. −.160 * * * ) Mother attitudes (high values = work-ethic) .489 * * * ) .503 * * * ) .110 * * * ) .205 * * * ) Mother attitudes × Intensive welfare history .063 * * * ) 
Similarly, the expected utility function of a parent of type L can be written as
A parent of type H maximizes equation 10 with respect to l H . Simplifying the first-order condition gives us 
Neighborhood effect
It is first helpful to analyze how their parents' equilibrium labor supply choices vary with σ. Using the implicit function theorem, we have
Hence, ceteris paribus, an increase in the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic decreases the labor supply of the strong work ethic parents, but increases the labor supply of the weak work ethic parents. This occurs because as the proportion of people in the neighborhood with a strong work ethic decreases, the probability that a child will have a strong work ethic also decreases. Strong work ethic parents try to make up for this by increasing the proportion of time they allocate to work. This implies cultural substitution in the terminology of Bisin and Verdier (2001) . Weak work ethic parents, on the other hand, exhibit cultural complementarity and choose to work 39 less. This is because the marginal utility of labor for them is increasing in σ: 
The results on the impact of a change in σ follow from investigating the following expres- 
18 To understand this, note that a marginal increase in the labor supply choice of a weak work ethic parent increases the likelihood that the child will have a high work ethic. This decreases the parent's utility by an amount proportional to (V LL − V LH ). This can be seen in the second and third terms of equation 13. However, the parent will only suffer this disutility if the neighborhood was also unsuccessful in passing a high work ethic to the child. The probability that the neighborhood is unsuccessful is (1 − σ). As σ increases, this probability decreases, which reduces the cost of increased labor supply choice for the type L parent.
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